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Meningococcal disease is caused by the bacterium Neisseria meningitidis and 
presents as septicaemia, meningitis or by a combination of septicaemia and 
meningitis (1, 2, 3). More seldom, meningococcal disease occurs as an entity 
called chronic meningococcemia characterised by fever, rash and arthritis (4). The 
overall fatality rate of meningococcal disease is approximately 10 %, but in 
septicaemia the fatality rate may reach 30 % (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10).  
 
Bacteriology, immunity and typing methods 
N. meningitidis is identified by microscopy of gram stained specimens and 
standard biochemical tests applied on pure culture (11). The bacterium may be 
classified into serogroups based on antigenic differences in the capsular 
polysaccharides. There are at least 10 different serogroups the most commonly 
occurring denoted A, B, C, Y, and W135 (11, 12).  The serogroup classification is 
important because the capsular polysaccharides of serogroup A, C, Y and W135 
are highly antigenic and exposure by invasive disease, carriage or by vaccination 
stimulates the formation of bactericidal antibodies which are correlated with 
protection against (13, 14, 15, 16, 17). There exist vaccines against these four 
serogroups (18, 19).  The serogroup B polysaccharide is not immunogenic in 
humans, probably because it is expressed on brain cell in the foetus and is 
therefore a part of “self” (20) 
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Meningococci can further be divided into serotypes and sero-subtypes based on 
immunogenic differences in proteins of the cell wall’s outer membrane. The 
Norwegian group B meningococcus mainly has the serotype 15:P1.16 (21, 22). 
Vaccines have been made against the serotype antigens. A nation-wide study was 
performed in Norway nearly 20 years ago. The vaccine was safe, but had only  57 
%  protection and protection lasted for only 6 months (23, 24).   
Chromosomal DNA fingerprinting. The first genetic method, chromosomal 
DNA fingerprinting, was developed by our group at The University of Tromsø in 
the early eighties (13, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29). The method uses restriction 
endonucleases recognising unique DNA fragments of 6 base pairs, to cleave 
chromosomal DNA into fragments with a mean length of approximately 4000 
base pairs. The fragments are separated according to length, by gel electrophoresis 
followed by staining. The resulting  band pattern consists of approximately 50 
different bands, and each strain has its unique band pattern, comparable to the bar 
codes printed on almost every items that are sold today (Fig. 1).  The method is 
laborious and takes 2 days to perform after having obtained pure culture of the 
bacterium.  
PCR amplicon restriction endonuclease analyses (PCR AREA). PCR 
AREA was developed by us (21, 30, 31, 32). The method is rapid, can be 
performed in one day, and may be applied on non-pure growth of the 
meningococcus on primary plates. DNA is extracted and a PCR procedure is 
performed using primers from the gene (folP) coding for sulphonamide resistance 
which is a marker for virulence (31, 32). The 950 base pairs – large PCR product 
is further cleaved by restriction endonuclease resulting in a band pattern that is 
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unique for each bacterial strain (Fig. 2). The PCR AREA is therefore convenient 
for the rapid recognition of a disease-causing strain in close contacts.   By 
applying the same PCR method on cerebrospinal fluids from patients with 
meningococcal meningitis, we were able to develop the first PCR based method 
for diagnosis of bacterial meningitis (33).  
MLST typing. However, for classification of the genus N. meningitidis, the 
MLST (multilocus sequence typing) has been internationally accepted as the 
present gold standard (34, 35, 36). Also other variants of genetic typing methods 
have been published (36, 37, 38) 
 
Carriage of meningococci 
N. meningitidis is part of the normal flora and most people will during their lives 
be a transient carrier of the bacterium (39, 40, 41). The carrier state will last for up 
to 1 year. During carriage the host will produce bactericidal antibodies which will 
protect against invasive disease (17). Carriage of meningococci may therefore be 
looked upon as “nature’s vaccine” against meningococci. Consequently, carriage 
of meningococci should never be terminated by chemoprophylaxis unless it is a 
disease-causing strain. These natural occurring antibodies appear around the age 
of 16, and increases in amount with age (13). There is an inverse relation between 
the protective antibodies and the age specific incidence of meningococcal disease 
(Fig 2). Approximately 10 % of a normal population will carry N. meningitidis at 
a given time. It has been shown by us (13) and in a study from the Oslo area (39), 
that approximately 90 % of the carrier strains are never found in patients and may 
be regarded as non-virulent. The remaining 10 % of the carrier strains possess a 
DNA fingerprint  indistinguishable from bacteria isolated from patients and may 
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be regarded as virulent strains. Carriers of these strains are probably the source of 
meningococcal disease. These carriers are at risk of developing meningococcal 
disease themselves or may become chronic asymptomatic carriers spreading the 
bacterium to susceptible persons. 
 
Measures for preventing the spread of meningococcal disease. 
Since there exist no vaccines against serogroup B meningococci, the first case of 
group B meningococcal disease in a community cannot be prevented.  Other 
measures to prevent the disease from spreading must be applied. The classical 
way of stopping an infection by identification of the causative agent and stopping 
its spreading route, may be applied. Consequently, it will be necessary to identify 
the person(s) carrying the disease-causing strain and eradicate the disease-causing 
strain before it spread further. Eradication of the disease-causing strain by 
chemoprophylaxis may be obtained. Chemoprophylaxis is treating a person with a 
short  course of  antibiotics to remove a potential hazardous microorganism from a 
a person without symptoms of disease. Rifampicin or ciprofloxacin for 2 days are 
most commonly used for chemoprophylaxis of meningococcal disease, and have 
in systematic reviews, been shown to prevent secondary cases (42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 
47, 48, 49, 50). Penicillin, which is the first choice for treating patients with 
invasive meningococcal disease, does nor eradicate meningococci from the throat 
because of its poor penetration to the mucosal surface (51). Most countries apply 
the use of chemoprophylactic treatment of all close contacts of the primary patient 
to prevent spread of the infection (46, 47, 48, 49, 50). The pitfall of this strategy is 
overuse of antibiotics because most (< 5 %) close contacts do not carry the 
disease-causing strain (53). Overuse increases the risk of inducing bacterial 
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resistance. The Norwegian group B meningococcus which is highly virulent, has 

















Figure 1. Fingerprint of 
 meningococcal 
chromosomal DNA 
Figure 2. PCR amplicon 
restriction endonuclease 
analysis, PCRAREA 
Figure 3. Plot of age specific 
incidence of meningococcal 
disease versus antibody level 
(from refr. 13)  
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 The Norway recommendations for preventing spread of meningococcal disease 
(54) are not aimed at eradicating the disease-causing strain from the contacts, but 
at protect family members at the highest risk of contracting secondary infection. 
The patient’s family members (household members) below 16 years of age are 
defined as having invasive infection regardless of clinical symptoms. They are 
kept at home from school or kindergarten and are treated with penicillin orally for 
7 days. . However, the efficacy of this strategy is disputed as it has been 
documented (51) that household members below 15 years may develop invasive 
disease after penicillin treatment has stopped. The reason is that the disease-
causing strain has not been eradicated and therefore may infect susceptible person 
following the stop of penicillin treatment. The Norwegian strategy has been 
criticized (48, 53) for not aiming at eradication of the disease-causing strain from 
the environment. 
 
Epidemiology of meningococcal disease 
Meningococcal disease occurs mostly as sporadic cases in western countries, but 
may cause local outbreaks (2, 3, 55, 56).  Endemics of meningococcal disease 
may occur which was the case in Norway during the period from 1974 until the 
late eighties (6, 56, Fig. 4). However, in the African meningococcal belt (Fig. 5), 
endemics are almost an annual event (2, 55, 58). The reasons may be that the 
mucosal surfaces of the airways are dried out making people susceptible to 
infections, poor health condition and low vaccine coverage. Of the 550.000 cases 
of meningococcal disease occurring worldwide per year, approximately 500.000 
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occur in Africa (57), mainly caused by the serogroup A or W135 meningococci 
(57, 58).   
Meningococcal disease in the county of Telemark before the 
Telemark Meningococcal Project 
The background for the Telemark Meningococcal Project was the large number of 
secondary cases that occurred in Telemark during the period from 1984 to 1987. 
During these 4 years there were a total of 43 cases of meningococcal cases of 
which five were the primary cases for 12 bacteriologically verified and 4 
suspected secondary cases of meningococcal disease (42). The prevalence of 
secondary cases of all cases was therefore nearly 30 %. At Notodden it was a 
large outbreak with a total of 8 cases all associated with one particular high-
school. The first case appeared in March 1986 and the final in November 1986 
causing widespread concern and anxiety and high consumption of antibiotics, 
prescribed by desperate local physicians. We had developed DNA typing methods 
that enabled the rapid and reliable identification of the disease - causing strain of 
N. meningitidis (13, 25, 26). The situation following the occurrence of a primary 
case of meningococcal disease is schematically visualized in Fig. 6. There will be 
three variants of carriers: 
• Carriers of non-virulent meningococci 
• Carriers of virulent meningococci 
• Non-carriers 
Carriers of the disease-causing strain should be identified and the bacterium 





Figure 5. Incidences of 
meningococcal disease in Africa 
Figure 4. Cases of meningococcal disease in Norway 1977-2008 (figures from National 
Inst of Public Health, Oslo, refr.56) 


















































study we report the 20-years experiences with the Telemark Meningococcal 
Project and we try to evaluate:  
1. if the interventions of the Telemark Meningococcal Project may have 
prevented secondary infection;  
2. which of the contacts  has the highest risk of carrying the disease-causing 
strain; and  
3. the costs of the Project.    
Figure 6. A theoretical model for the spread of the disease-causing 
strain  at the time a case of meningococcal disease occurs in a 
population (red). There are persons carrying the disease-causing strain 
(yellow), contacts carrying other strains of meningococci (green) as 
well as non-carriers (turquoise). The aim of the Meningococcal Project 
of Telemark is to identify the contacts carrying the disease-causing 
strain (yellow) and to treat these with rifampicin to eradicate it from 






Materials and Methods 
Organization of the project.  
In 1987, the County Health Officer of the County of Telemark (165.000 
inhabitants) distributed the recommendations for the Telemark Meningococcal 
Project to all local community infection control physicians, general practitioners, 
departments of medicine and paediatrics at all four hospitals of Telemark, and to 
the private medical microbiology laboratory of Telelab which served as the 
official microbiology laboratory for all hospitals, institutions and outpatients 
clinics in all Telemark (Appendix A). These guidelines were developed through 
the collaboration between consultants of the Departments of medicine and 
paediatrics at the Telemark Central Hospital, the consultant at Telelab and a local 
community infection control physician. The recommendations contained detailed 
information on: 
• the pre-hospital and hospital collection of specimens for  bacterial 
diagnosis, clinical diagnosis and treatment of meningococcal disease,  
• diagnostic procedures to be applied and information to be given to the 
local physician by the microbiology laboratory,   
•  procedures for identifying close contacts of patients,  
• sampling of throat cultures from close contacts and registration of their 
relation to the patient, age and sex and telephone number in case of need 
for chemoprophylactic treatment 
• schemes for chemoprophylactic treatment with rifampicin of contacts who 
carry the disease-causing strain 
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• post-treatment bacterial control of contacts carrying the disease-causing 
strain.  
• information policy to the public by  meetings, press-releases, and letters to 
family and affected community.   
 
Interventions undertaken by the Telemark Meningococcal 
Project.  
Typically, when a case of meningococcal disease was suspected by the consulting 
general practitioner, the patient was immediately admitted to hospital after blood 
culture and throat samples were collected. When the transport time exceeded 30 
minutes, the patient was given penicillin intramuscularly or intravenously. On 
admission in hospital blood samples including blood culture, throat samples as 
well as cerebrospinal fluid were collected and sent immediately to the 
laboratories. At the Telelab AS, the specimens were cultured on appropriate media 
and a gram stained specimen was prepared for microscopic examination. The 
Telemark Meningococcal Project was initiated by the microbiologist on: 
• the finding of gram negative diplococci in the gram stained cerebrospinal 
fluid specimen (Day 0) or, 
•  growth of gram negative diplococci in blood culture (Day 1) or, 
• growth of oxydase positive, gram negative diplococci on plates incubated 
with cerebrospinal fluid (Day 1) or, 
• growth of serogroup B meningococci from the throat without growth from 
blood or from the cerebrospinal fluid in patients who had been given 
penicillin before admission and who presented on admission with fever, 
neck stiffness and/or petecchial bleedings (Day 1).   
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Upon confirmation of meningococci in specimen(s) from the patient, the 
microbiologist on duty (either of two) shall: 
• inform the doctor on duty at the hospital and collect information on the  
patient (address, family members, whether working, in school, 
kindergarten or at home, which persons have slept in the same room as 
the patient during the preceding 2 weeks, kissing contacts)  
• alarm the local infectious disease control physician and define who are 
close contacts from whom throat sampling shall be performed, plan throat 
sampling and information meeting (Day 1 or 2)  
In every case there was held an information meeting for family, contacts, and 
other persons affected by the outbreak with the attendance of both the 
microbiologist and the local infection disease control physician. Figure 7 shows a 
review of how the sampling of close contacts is performed. The throat specimens 
were plated immediately after collection and data of each contact was collected. 
Upon arrival back to the laboratory the specimens were incubated and the plates 
read the days thereafter (Day 2 or 3), and meningococci identified on Day 3 or 4. 
DNA fingerprinting was performed on Day 3 or 4. In 1995, the method for 
identification disease-causing strains was changed to the PCR AREA method 
developed by us (30). The PCR AREA method enables the identification of the 
disease-causing strain to be obtained on Day 2 or 3 (Table 1). Information of 
whom were carriers of the disease-causing strain was given by the microbiologist 
to the local infection control physician, who was responsible for starting 
chemoprophylactic treatment with rifampicin. Rifampicin was made available 
from the hospital pharmacy (Appendix A). All contacts who carried the disease-
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causing strain were controlled with culture 7-10 days following 
chemoprophylaxis.    
 
Bacteriological methods  
Specimens from the patients (blood, cerebrospinal fluid and nasopharynx) and 
from the close contacts (nasopharynx) were cultured on standard media and 
incubated in 10% CO2 overnight as described (11). Growth of oxydase positive 
colonies was gram stained for gram negative diplococcic. On growth of pure 
culture, meningococci were identified by degradation of glucose and maltose, but 
not of sucrose, lactose or tributyrine. Sulphonamide susceptibility was tested by 
the e-test, and serogrouping was performed using antibodies against the different 
serogroups in a slide-agglutination test (11).   DNA fingerprinting and later PCR 
AREA for strain identification was performed as published (25, 30). All strains of 
meningococci were frozen at – 700C. 
 
Databases and statistical calculations.  
The data for the patients and for the contacts were first written into Dbase III +. 
For the statistical calculations the Dbase III + files were imported and converted 
into SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS UK, Ltd., 2006). Relative risks and chi-






  Day DNA fingerprinting (1987-94) PCR AREA (1995-2007) 
Day 0 Identification of gram negative diplococci in CSF Identification of gram negative diplococci in CSF 
 Information to hospital consultant Information to hospital consultant 
 Alarm to local infectious disease control physician Alarm to local infectious disease control physician 
 Identification of close contacts Identification of close contacts 
 Planning of information meeting and throat sampling Planning of information meeting and throat sampling 
Day 1 Information meeting for affected population Information meeting for affected population 
 Throat specimen sampling of close contacts Throat specimen sampling of close contacts 
 Plating and incubation Plating and incubation 
Day 2 Reading plates. Spreading for pure culture Reading plates. DNA extraction of oxydase positive growth 
  Identification of  disease-causing strain from PCR AREA pattern 
  Information to carriers of disease-causing strain 
  Start of chemoprophylactic chemotherapy with rifampicin 
Day 3 Identification of meningococci  
 Extraction and cleavage of DNA from meningococci  
 Start electrophoresis of DNA fragment  
Day 4 
Identification of disease-causing strain from DNA 
fingerprint pattern  
 Information to carriers of disease-causing strain  
 Start of chemoprophylactic chemotherapy with rifampicin  
Day 
11-14 Bacterial control of contacts with disease-causing strain Bacterial control of contacts with disease-causing strain 
 
Table 1. Steps in the Telemark Meningococcal Project from the day of microbial verification of meningococcal 
disease (Day 0) until bacterial control after chemoprophylaxis using either the DNA fingerprint method or the 




Figure 7 (row by row from top left): plates and spatula needed for collection of 
nasopharynx samples, teaching close contacts how to say ”AAAAA” before collection of 
specimens, samples are collected using one single cotton swab which are rolled over both 
tonsils and nasopharynx mucosa, collection of sample by the microbiologist, incubation 
of plates, spreading culture for purification, growth of meningococci on chocolate plate, 
degradation of sugars for identification of meningococci, extraction of DNA, PCR AREA 




During the study period from November 1, 1987 until October 31, 2007, there 
were 66 cases of bacteriologically verified meningococcal disease in the county of 
Telemark. There was no secondary case of meningococcal disease. All 66 cases 
were primary cases with no link to each other.   











Figure 8. Age distribution of the 66 primary cases of meningococcal 














Table. 2. Age distribution of the 66 patients 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
0 3 4,5 4,5 4,5 
1 10 15,2 15,2 19,7 
2 3 4,5 4,5 24,2 
3 7 10,6 10,6 34,8 
4 6 9,1 9,1 43,9 
5 3 4,5 4,5 48,5 
6 2 3,0 3,0 51,5 
7 2 3,0 3,0 54,5 
8 1 1,5 1,5 56,1 
10 1 1,5 1,5 57,6 
11 3 4,5 4,5 62,1 
15 2 3,0 3,0 65,2 
16 2 3,0 3,0 68,2 
17 1 1,5 1,5 69,7 
18 5 7,6 7,6 77,3 
19 2 3,0 3,0 80,3 
20 1 1,5 1,5 81,8 
33 1 1,5 1,5 83,3 




Table 2 and Fig. 1 both show the age distribution of the 66 patients. The age-specific 
prevalence was highest in the youngest age group. Thirty-four (51,5 %) of the patients 
were six years of age or younger. There is also a high number of patients at 18 and 19 
years of age (10, 6 %). Only 18,2 % of the patients were above 20 years of age. 












Sources of material for isolation of N.  meningitidis. Meningococci were 
isolated in blood culture from 48 % of the patients, from the cerebrospinal fluid in 
39,4 5 of the patients (patients with meningitis), and from nasal or nasopharyngeal 
specimens in 12,1 % of the patients. The latter patients had all clinical signs of 
septicaemia (petecchial bleedings) and/or meningitis (neck-stiffness), but in whom 
culture from blood and cerebrospinal fluid failed due to antibiotic treatment before 
collecting clinical specimens. 
 
 
Table 3. Sex distribution of the 66 patients 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Men 41 62,1 62,1 62,1 
Women 25 37,9 37,9 100,0 
Valid 













Clinical outcome. A total of 5 (7,6 %) of the patients died. The age of those 
who died (Fig. 9) was higher (mean 31,8 years, CI =  9,9 – 73,6) than in those 
who survived (mean 15,3 years, CI  =  9,9 – 20,7). Three out of 41 (7, 3 %) males 
died and 2 (8 %) out of 25 females had a fatal outcome. 
Table 4. Sources of material for the isolation of N.meningitidis. BK= 
blood culture, HA= nasopharyngeal specimen, NE= nose, CSF= 
cerebrospinal fluid 
Figure 9. Age of patients who 





















 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
BK 32 48,5 48,5 48,5 
HA 7 10,6 10,6 59,1 
NE 1 1,5 1,5 60,6 




Annual number of cases. The annual numbers of bacteriologically verified 
cases are shown in Table 5. The annual numbers of notified cases to the 
Norwegian notification system for infectious diseases (MSIS, National Institute of 
Public Health, Oslo) are shown in the same table. The discrepancy between the 
annual figures may be due to the fact that both suspected and verified cases are 
notifiable to the National Institute of Public Health.  
Table 5. Annual number of 
bacteriological verified (Telelab AS) and 
notified cases (National Inst Public 
Health, Oslo) of systemic meningococcal 
disease in the County of Telemark 1987 - 
2007  
 
Year Verified Notified 
1987* 3 3 
1988 8 10 
1989 2 2 
1990 6 7 
1991 7 8 
1992 7 9 
1993 2 2 
1994 3 2 
1995 3 4 
1996 7 8 
1997 4 4 
1998 3 3 
1999 2 2 
2000 3 3 
2001 2 2 
2002 2 2 
2003 1 1 
2004 0 0 
2005 1 1 
2006 0 0 
2007 0 0 
Total 66 73 
   




Serogroup distribution of disease-causing strains. Table 6 shows that  the 
predominant serogroup among the 66 case strains was  the serogroup B causing 
disease in almost 65 % of the patients. Serogroup C was isolated from 




















A total of 2252 close contacts of the 66 patients were identified and included.  In 
two (3 %) out of the 66 patients, no close contacts were identified. The disease-
causing strain was isolated from close contacts of 37 (56, 1 %) out of the 66 
patients; in 29 (43, 9 %) cases, no close contact colonized with the disease-
causing strain was detected. The mean number of close contacts per patient was 
34, 1 (range 0-198, SD 33,9). There were 1151 (51, 1 %) female and 1101 (48, 9 
%) male contacts.  
 
 Group Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
A 1 1,5 1,5 1,5 
B 42 63,6 63,6 65,2 
C 17 25,8 25,8 90,9 
W135 2 3,0 3,0 93,9 
Y 4 6,1 6,1 100,0 
Valid 
Table 6. Distribution of serogroups among the disease-causing 
meningococcal strains from the 66 patients 
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Bacterial findings. The number of close contacts carrying a strain of 
N.meningitidis was 302 (13, 4 %). Other oxydase positive diplococcal species 
(Moraxella catarrhalis and Neisseria lactamica) were found in 243 (10, 8 %) 
contacts (Table 7). Of the 302 isolates of N.meningitidis, 70 (23,2 %) were 











causing strain among all close contacts was 3, 1 % (70/2252). The carriage rate of 
non-disease causing meningococci among all close contacts was 10, 3 %. Of the 
70 close contacts who carried a disease-causing strain, 26 were females (37, 1 %) 
and 44 (62,9 %) were males. Among the 232 who carried a non-disease causing 
meningococcal strain, 103 (44,4 %) were females and 129 (55,6 %) were males.  
 
 
Table 7. Bacterial species isolated from the nasopharynx of 2252 close 
contacts. M.CA= Moraxella catarrhalis, N.LA= Neisseria lactamica, 
N.MC= Neisseria meningitidis,  
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
  1707 75,8 75,8 75,8 
M.CA 79 3,5 3,5 79,3 
N.LA 164 7,3 7,3 86,6 
N.MC 302 13,4 13,4 100,0 
Neg 
Total 2252 100,0 100,0   
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In whom could the disease-causing strain be found?  
The close contacts were divided into 20 contact groups according to their relation 
to the patient (Table 8).   Groups 1-17 consists of persons who had direct contacts 
with the patient (primary contacts).  Whenever a primary contact was shown to 
carry a disease-causing strain, his or hers kissing contacts and household-members 
were also screened for meningococci colonization. These contacts were defined as 
secondary contacts and were categorized into contact group 18. Tertiary contacts 
(contact group 19) were household-members and kissing contacts of secondary 
contacts that carried the disease-causing strain and finally, quartary contacts 
(contact group 20) were similarly related to tertiary contacts. The 6 first groups of 
contacts are household - members or kissing contact. In these 6 groups, containing  
210 persons, the prevalence of the disease-causing strain was 13,3 % whereas the 
prevalence of non-disease causing meningococci was  7,6 %, giving a total 
prevalence of meningococcal carriage of 20,9 %.  Among the remaining 1917 
primary contacts the carrier rate  of the disease-causing strain in the nasopharynx 






Figure 11. A summary of the finding of disease-causing 
strain in primary, secondary, tertiary and quartary contacts 








Figure 10. The result of the environmental study in a kindergarten following a 
case of meningococcal septicemia in a 2 years old girl (red circle) diagnosed 
on Sept. 11 (!). On Day 1 (Sept. 12), we identified two other children in the 
kindergarten carrying the same disease-causing strain (red triangles) as well 
as one adult employee (red squares). Further investigations of these three 
contacts revealed that the mother and grandmother of one child and the 
teenage son of the adult employee harbored the disease-causing strain. By 
extended studies of these person’s household-members and kissing contacts, 
no more carriers of the disease-causing strain was revealed. All carriers of the 














group Relation to the patient Frequency Percent Identical 
Identical 
% Different Different % 
1 Fathers 49 2,2 6 12,2 3 6,1 
2 Mothers 51 2,3 6 11,8 3 5,9 
3 Sisters 37 1,6 3 8,1 1 2,7 
4 Brothers 39 1,7 7 17,9 3 7,7 
5 Kissing contacts 10 0,4 4 40,0 0 0,0 
6 Others 24 1,1 2 8,3 6 25,0 
  Sum household members 210 9,3 28 13,3 16 7,6 
7 Grandparents 56 2,5 4 7,1 6 10,7 
8 Playmates family 116 5,2 2 1,7 20 17,2 
9 Playmates 286 12,7 6 2,1 48 16,8 
10 Nursery employees 114 5,1 2 1,8 4 3,5 
11 Childminders 6 0,3 1 16,7 1 16,7 
12 Other family 214 9,5 5 2,3 37 17,3 
13 Classmates 342 15,2 5 1,5 48 14,0 
14 Children at nursery 421 18,7 2 0,5 11 2,6 
15 Teachers 65 2,9 0 0,0 3 4,6 
16 Colleagues 3 0,1 0 0,0 2 66,7 
17 Others 294 13,1 7 2,4 25 8,5 
  
Sum other primary 
contacts 1917 85,1 34 1,8 205 10,7 
  Total close contacts 2127 94,4 62 2,9 221 10,4 
18 Secondary contacts 86 3,8 5 5,8 9 10,5 
19 Tertiary contacts 16 0,7 3 18,8 2 12,5 
20 Quartary contacts 19 0,8 0 0,0 0 0,0 
  Sum 2248 99,8 70 3,1 232 10,3 
 Missing 4 0,2      
  Total 2252 100 70 3,1 232 10,3 
 
Table 8. The number of contacts in different groups according to relation to the patient. 
“Identical” denotes a contact carrying a disease causing strain of N.  meningitidis, and “Different” 





In the secondary carriers, the carriage rate of the disease-causing strain was 5, 8 %, among 
tertiary contacts 18, 8 % and in quartary contacts 0 %.  
Odds Ratio for being a carrier of the disease-causing strain. From Table 8 it can be 
calculated that the Odds Ratio (OR) for carrying the disease-causing strain being a house-
member or a kissing contact (contact groups 1-6) is 8, 52. These contacts, therefore, have  8, 
52 times higher risk than other primary contacts, to carry the disease-causing strain. The chi-
square value was calculated to 15, 31 which gives shows that the difference in Odds Ratio is 
statistical significant at p < 0, 0005 level with one degree of freedom (df=1). Furthermore, the 
attributable risk percentage in the exposed (AR %) can be calculated from the formula: 
 
AR % = Risk (exposed) – Risk (unexposed)/Risk (exposed) X 100 
 
where “exposed” are the household-members and kissing contacts, and “non-exposed” are 
other primary contacts. The AR % is (13,3 – 1,8)/13,3 X 100 = 86,5 %, which means that of 
the total risk of carrying the disease-causing strain, being a household-member or a kissing 
contact, 86,5 % of the risk stems from being in contact groups 1-6, the remaining risk being 








Cost – benefit estimates and cost utility analyses 
The costs of the Project are mainly linked to the laboratory analyses. The flow-
chart for the procedures leading from sampling and culture to conclusive 
“identity” or “not-identity” for the nasopharyngeal specimens from all 2252 
contacts,  is shown in Fig 12. Each procedure has its own price determined by the 
Ministry of Health. Hence, it is possible to estimate the total costs of the Project. 
All prices and costs are given in 2007 - values.  The total costs of the project are 
estimated to 660.000 NOK (Table 9A). What has been gained by this money? A 
saving of the Project is the hospitalization cost of the persons who were prevented 
from contracting meningococcal disease. How many cases were prevented by our 
interventions? The number of cases of meningococcal that may have been 
prevented by the Project can be calculated from the expected prevalence of 
secondary cases. Given that  66 is the number of primary cases, the expected total 
number of cases is 66 plus the expected number of secondary cases. In the 
literature, the prevalence of secondary infections is reported to vary between <2 % 
(65) and 30 % (42) with 10 % reported from all Norway (66). Given a prevalence 
of secondary cases at 2 %, the expected number of cases is 67,3; hence 1 
secondary infection may have been prevented. Given a prevalence of secondary 
infection at 10 % (66), the total number of expected cases is 73, 3, consequently, 7 
secondary cases may have been prevented.   
 
The calculations for hospitalization costs are performed according to instructions 
given by the Norwegian Social- and Health Directorate (67). There is a unit price 
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presently at 33647 NOK. Each diagnosis is given a Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG) point according to estimated costs for that particular diagnosis (laboratory 
tests, X-ray procedures, treatment procedures and drugs). According to this 
system, meningococcal disease has three different cost categories or DRG points: 
• Infections in the central nervous system: 2, 21 points.  
• Septicemia below 17 years of age: 2,44 points 
• Septicemia in patients 17 years of age or older: 1,94 
 
The savings of hospitalization costs varied from approximately 82.000 NOK (1 
secondary case prevented) to approximately 470.000 NOK (7 patients prevented, 
Table 9B). It was assumed that of the 7 patients that may have been prevented, 3 
had septicemia and were below 17 years, 3 had meningitis, and one patient was 
above 17 years and had septicemia. The saving in hospitalization costs, therefore 
was less than the costs of the Project (660.000 NOK). 
 
But in addition to saving costs for hospitalization, which can be said to be the 
cost-benefit effect of the Project, the patients who may have been prevented from 
contracting disease, may also benefit by not having its health related life quality 
reduced following meningococcal disease. In the worst case meningococcal 
disease may be fatal, and 30 % of those with septicemia die (10), the overall 
mortality is 10 %. Consequently, there may be a benefit from the Project that 
cannot be measured in money, prevention of reduced health quality of life.  This 
may be called the cost – utility effect and can be measured by cost – utility 
analyses. We apply the QALY (quality adjusted life years) principles to calculate 
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the improvement in health related quality of life that is assumed to be gained from 
our interventions. Our calculations are based on some assumptions: 
• The life-expectancy of patients who survive meningococcal disease is not 
shortened 
• There is a small, but significant risk for patients who recover from 
meningococcal disease to get permanent sequelae (68, 69, 70), the most 
common being psycho-social, physical and orthopedic problems and some 
few cases with epilepsy, hearing loss and blindness.  
• Patients who contract meningococcal disease had no reduction in health 
related quality of life before contracting meningococcal disease 
• All patients who may have been prevented survived with no fatal case.  
Based on the literature reporting sequelae, we estimate that the reduction in health 
associated QALY in patients recovering from meningococcal disease to be 0, 2 on 
a range from 0 - 1 where 1 represents no reduction in health-related life quality 
and = is death. Given that the age of the prevented cases corresponds to the mean 
age of the 66 patients (17 years), their remaining life span can be calculated by 
means of the calculator that is found on the homepage of Statistisk Sentralbyrå 
(http://www.ssb.no/vis/emner/02/02/10/dode/art-2008-04-10-01.html). If the 
patients is a woman at 17 years of age, she will have a life-expectancy of 82 years 
(and 2 months) living in Telemark. Being a male at 17 years of age, the life-
expectancy is 77 years (76 years and 9 months). As more than 60 % of the patients 
are males, the calculations of QALY at the  2 % prevalence level will be done for 
a male and at the 10 % prevalence level (7 secondary cases prevented) for 3 
females and 4 males. The QALY can be calculated by the formulas: 
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([[TF * (H1 – H0)] * NF] + [TM * (H1 - H0)] * NM]]) 2 %prevalence  
([[TF * (H1 – H0)] * NF] + [TM * (H1 - H0)] * NM]]) 10 % prevalence  
 
where H1 is the health quality without contracting secondary disease which is 
assumed to have the value “1”, H0  is the quality of life after recovering from 
secondary disease and is set to “0, 8”, TF ( 65 years) is the remaining life 
expectancy for females at 17 years of age, and TM (60 years) for males at 17 
years of age, living in Telemark, NF is the number of female patients who were 
prevented, and NM the number of males prevented from secondary infection. 
 
(65 * 0,2 * 0 + 60 * 0,2 * 1) 2 % level = 0 + 12 = 12 QALYS 
(65 * 0,2 * 3 + 60 * 0,2 * 4) 10 % level = 29 + 48 = 77 QALYS 
 
Given a prevalence of secondary infections between 2 % and 10 %, the health 
quality gain from the Project are in the magnitude of from 12 – 77  QALYS.  
 
The Telemark Meningococcal Project may have additional positive effects that are 
difficult to measure. The affected population is offered immediate oral and written 
information on meningococcal disease which may lead to quicker response once a 
secondary case occurs. Moreover, information and the fact that something active 
is done (bacterial testing), may prevent much of the anxiety that always follows 
the footsteps of meningococcal disease. The local health system which is under 
significant pressure in this case, gets active support from the Specialist Health 
Care System. Local physicians have expressed a relief in their situation as a 
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Figure 12. Flow-chart for processing nasopharynx samples from 
close contacts according to the recommendations of the Telemark 
Meningococcal Project (Appendix B). The figures represent the 













Culture of meningococci 83 2252 186916 
Oxydase testing 38 545 20710 
Gram staining 38 545 20710 
Sugar fermentation 38 545 20710 
Sulphonamide susceptibility testing 38 302 11476 
Agglutination (3 serogroups) 114 302 34428 
DNA fingerprinting, alone (until 1994) 909 150 136350 
DNA fingerprinting in combination with PCR AREA (from 
1995) 909 152 138168 
PCR AREA (from 1995) 606 152 92112 
    
Total costs of the Telemark Meningococcal Project     661580 
 
Table 9A. Estimates of the costs of the Project. The costs are mainly linked to the laboratory 
procedures.  
   At 2 % prevalence level At 10 % prevalence level 
Diagnosis Related Group  Unit price 
DRG 
points No. patients Costs (NOK) No. patients Costs (NOK) 
20. Infection of CNS 33647 2,21 0 0 3 223079,61 
416. Septicemia > 17 years of age 33647 1,94 0 0 1 0 
417. Septicemia 17 years or younger 33647 2,44 1 82098,68 3 246296,04 
       
Total cost of hospitalization of prevented cases   82098,68  469375,65 
 
Table 9B. Estimates of the costs of hospitalization of patients who were prevented from contracting secondary 
meningococcal disease by the intervention measures of the Project. At a level of 2 % prevalence of secondary 




Does the Telemark Meningococcal Project prevent secondary 
cases?  
During the Project period, there was no secondary case of meningococcal disease, 
but 66 bacteriological verified primary cases. A vital question is if this absence of 
secondary cases was a consequence of our intervention, or whether it can be 
explained by chance. As was discussed in the section above, the expected total 
number of cases of meningococcal disease is 66 X 100/98 = 67, 3 cases at a 2 % 
level of secondary cases. At the 10 % level, the expected number of total cases is 
66 X 100/90 = 73, 3 cases. Consequently, the number of cases which could have 
been prevented by our interventions varies between 1, 3 and 7, 3 cases. At the 30 
% level, the number of prevented cases would have been 28, 3. We find it not 
unlikely that these expected secondary cases have been prevented by our 
interventions. By applying the chi-square test on the differences between the 
number of cases that were identified (66 cases), and the expected number of cases, 
calculations show that the numbers are too small to demonstrate any difference of 
statistical significance at the 2 % or 10 % level, respectively. Only at a level of 15 
% prevalence of secondary cases, would the material allow the difference to be 
statistical significant. At the earlier reported level of 30 % prevalence from 
Telemark (42), the chi-square test shows a statistical significant difference at p = 
0,012.   
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Does the Telemark Meningococcal Project influence the number 
of primary cases of meningococcal cases? 
 Previous studies from Norway show that only a few different virulent strains are 
causing meningococcal disease (21, 30). These clones probably circulate in the 
population constantly.  By our interventions, the prevalence of these virulent 
clones may be reduced to such an extent that infecting chains are broken resulting 
in a reduction also of primary cases. The encounter between a virulent 
meningococcus and a susceptible host occurs less frequent because the virulent 
clone is “diluted” in the population; the “dilution” effect. This “dilution” effect is 
difficult to prove since it is known that there has been a decline in the incidence of 
meningococcal disease in all Norway during the last 20 years, probably caused by 
a rise in herd immunity against the circulating clones.  
 
To try to answer the question whether the interventions of the Telemark 
Meningococcal Project also reduced the number of primary cases, we compared 
the development of incidence of meningococcal disease in Norway, Telemark and 
the neighbouring county of Vestfold (220.000 inhabitants) during three 10-years 
periods: 
1. 1978-1987; the 10-years period immediately prior to the initiation of the 
Project 
2. 1988-1997; the first 10-years period after the Project was started 
3. 1998-2007; the second 10-years period after initiation of the Project 
While the effect on secondary cases is assumed to have immediate effect on the 
occurrence of meningococcal disease, the “dilution” effect will probably appear 
after several years of eradicative interventions. The reason for the late effect is 
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that it takes time to eradicate the virulent clones enough to block the routes of 
spread. We hypothesize that a reduction in the mean annual incidence from the 
first 10-years period to the second 10-years period after the project was started, 
has two explanations: 
• An increase in herd immunity leading to a general decline affecting also 
neighbouring counties 
• The “dilution” effect caused by systematic and thorough eradication of 
virulent clones of the Project 
The “dilution” effect can only be seen in Telemark, and the decrease in 
meningococcal disease occurrence shall be more pronounced in Telemark than in 
neighbouring counties. We therefore compared the incidences of meningococcal 
disease in Telemark with that of neighbouring counties of Vestfold, Buskerud and 
Aust-Agder (Table 10 and Fig. 13) in the two 10-years periods after the Project 
was started.  Fig. 14 shows a map of the region. The incidence of meningococcal 
disease in Telemark is constantly lower than in all Norway and in Vestfold during 
the last 10-years period of the Project (1998-2007). As can be seen from Fig. 15 
and Table 11 , the mean annual incidence in Telemark in the first 10-years period 
of the Project (1988-1997) was 3, 52 cases/100.000 inhabitants (CI  2, 13 – 4, 
91), and in the second 10-years period the mean annual incidence was 0, 86 (CI 0, 
34 – 1, 38). Since the confidence intervals do not overlap, the fall in the mean 
annual incidence is statistically significant. No statistical reduction in incidence 
was seen in Vestfold during the same periods Table 11, Fig. 15), nor in the two 
other neighbouring counties (data not shown). Consequently, it is tempting to 
speculate that the interventions in our Project may have contributed to the 
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significant fall in meningococcal disease incidence seen in Telemark from the 
period 1987-1996 to 1997 – 2007.    
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Table 10. Incidence of meningococcal disease in all Norway, in Telemark and in each of its neighbouring counties Buskerud, Vestfold and Aust.Agder 1978 – 2007 
as well in these neighbouring counties together (BVAA).  The cases are notified cases by the National Institute of Public Health, Oslo. No: number of cases, Popul: 
population in 100.000, Incid: incidence (No cases/100.000 inhabitants/year) 
 
County   1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
All  No. 270 323 230 257 267 368 302 317 263 259 177 176 165 167 201 126 102 158 139 115 105 83 83 78 51 48 37 39 35 30 
Norway Popul 40,8 40,8 40,9 40,9 41,1 41,3 41,5 41,6 41,8 41,9 42 42,2 42,4 42,5 42,7 43 43,2 43,5 43,7 43,9 44,2 44,5 44,8 45 45,2 45,5 45,8 46,1 46,4 46,8 
 Incid 6,6 7,9 5,6 6,3 6,5 8,9 7,3 7,6 6,3 6,2 4,2 4,2 3,9 3,9 4,7 2,9 2,4 3,6 3,2 2,6 2,4 1,9 1,9 1,7 1,1 1,1 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,6 
                                   
Buskerud No. 11 11 10 12 17 5 11 14 13 21 6 9 8 8 8 8 9 7 5 4 5 4 5 5 3 1 3 2 1 1 
 Popul 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,5 2,5 
 Incid 5,2 5,2 4,8 5,5 7,7 2,3 5 6,4 5,9 9,5 2,7 4,1 3,6 3,6 3,5 3,5 3,9 3 2,2 1,7 2,2 1,7 2,1 2,1 1,3 0,4 1,3 0,8 0,4 0,4 
                                   
Vestfold No. 15 19 19 18 11 16 18 21 20 14 11 5 5 8 6 5 3 1 9 5 5 7 2 5 4 2 2 4 3 3 
 Popul 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 
 Incid 8,3 10 10 9,5 5,8 8,4 9,5 11,1 10,5 7,4 5,8 2,6 2,5 4 3 2,5 1,5 0,5 4,5 2,4 2,4 3,3 1 2,3 1,8 0,9 0,9 1,8 1,4 1,4 
                                   
Aust- No. 3 1 1 4 2 3 1 3 2 1 4 5 3 5 7 4 4 6 7 0 3 0 5 2 1 2 0 2 1 3 
Agder Popul 0,9 0,9 0,9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Incid 3,3 1,1 1,1 4 2 3 1 3 2 1 4 5 3 5 7 4 4 6 7 0 3 0 5 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 
                                   
BVAA No. 29 31 30 34 30 24 30 38 35 36 21 19 16 21 21 17 16 14 21 9 13 11 12 12 8 5 5 8 5 7 
 Popul 4,8 4,9 4,9 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,7 
 Incid 6 6,3 6,1 6,7 5,9 4,7 5,9 7,5 6,9 7,1 4,1 3,7 3,1 4 4 3,2 3 2,6 4 1,7 2,4 2 2,2 2,1 1,4 0,9 0,9 1,4 0,9 1,2 
                                   
Telemark No. 6 3 3 9 5 17 6 8 14 14 10 2 7 8 9 2 2 4 8 4 3 2 3 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 
 Popul 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 
 Incid 3,8 1,9 1,9 5,6 3,1 10,6 3,8 5 8,8 8,8 6,3 1,3 4,4 5 5,6 1,3 1,3 2,5 5 2,5 1,9 1,3 1,8 1,2 1,2 0,6 0 0,6 0 0 
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Figure 13. Incidence of meningococcal disease in all Norway, and in the counties of 
Vestfold and Telemark 1978-2007 
Figure 14. The county of Telemark and its surrounding 
counties. The closest contact is between Telemark (165.000 





 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 
All Norway    
Confidence level (95 %) 0,71 0,54 0,44 
Upper confidence interval 
level 7,63 4,1 1,75 
Mean 6,92 3,56 1,31 
Lower confidence interval 
level 6,21 3,02 0,87 
    
Telemark    
Confidence level (95 %) 2,2 1,39 0,52 
Upper confidence interval 
level 7,53 4,91 1,38 
Mean 5,33 3,52 0,86 
Lower confidence interval 
level 3,13 2,13 0,34 
    
Vestfold    
Confidence level (95 %) 1,14 1,08 0,55 
Upper confidence interval 
level 10,19 4,01 2,27 
Mean 9,05 2,93 1,72 
Lower confidence interval 
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Figure 15. Mean annual incidence and confidence intervals (CI) of 
meningococcal disease in three 10-yeras periods: Per 1: 1978-1987, Per 2: 
1988-1997, Per 3: 1998-2007. The figures are notified cases to the National 
Inst Publ Health, Oslo 
Table 11. Annual mean incidences with confidence intervals 
for meningococcal disease during three 10-years periods in 
Norway, Vestfold and Telemark 1978-2007 
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Conclusions 
• There has been no secondary case of meningococcal disease in the county 
of Telemark after the Telemark Meningococcal Project was started in 
November 1987.  
• It is not unlikely that the Project has prevented from 1 to 7 cases of 
secondary meningococcal infections.  
• The prevalence of secondary cases was reduced from 30 % prior to the 
project (1984-87) to 0 % after the Project was started.  
• The annual incidence of meningococcal disease in Telemark has been 
constantly lower in Telemark during the last 10 years compared to the 
incidence in all Norway and in Vestfold. 
• There was a statistical significant fall in the mean annual incidence of 
notified meningococcal disease from the first 10-years period of the 
project (1988-97) to the second 10-years period (1998-2007). No statistical 
significant fall was seen in the neighboring counties of Vestfold, Buskerud 
or Aust-Agder. 
• The risk of being a carrier of the disease-causing strain is highest among 
house-hold members and kissing contacts. The administration of 
chemoprophylaxis to these contacts once meningococcal disease occurs 
should be implemented in Norwegian recommendations. 
• The costs of the Project are higher than what is saved hospitalization 
expenses for cases that may have been prevented. 
• The Project may have saved from 12 – 99 quality adjusted life years 
(QALY) 
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• The Project should be continued and its recommendations implemented on 
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(Dokumentet finnes også på Telelab sin hjemmeside: 
http://www.telelab.no/memimemen.htm) 
 
Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark er et tillegg til nasjonale retningslinjer om behandling og 
forebyggelse av meningokokksykdom og skal ikke erstatte disse.  
 
A. FORMÅL 
• Å hindre at smitten sprer seg og at det oppstår nye tilfeller av meningokokksykdom i 
nærmiljøet til pasienter med meningokokksykdom.  
• Å sikre at pasienter med mistenkt meningokokksykdom får stilt rask diagnose og at 
behandling igangsettes så tidlig som mulig.   
• Å sikre at lokalmiljøet får tilstrekkelig kunnskap om sykdommen slik at evt nye 
tilfeller blir oppdaget raskt og at unødig angst og uro i miljøet forhindres..  
• Å gi kommunehelsetjenesten spesialiststøtte ved utbrudd av meningokokksykdom 
med de store utfordinger dette fører med seg. 
 
B. DEFINISJONER 
• Primærtilfellet: det første tilfellet av meningokokksykdom i ett miljø 
• Koprimære tilfeller: tilfeller av meningokokksykdom som oppstår innenfor 24 timer 
i det samme miljøet som hos primærtilfellet 
• Sekundærtilfeller: tilfeller som skyldes smittespredning og som oppstår mer enn 24 
etter primær tilfellet. Et sekundær tilfelle kan oppstå måneder etter primær tilfellet. 
Ved genetiske metoder kan det påvises også evt spredning til andre miljøer. Også 
slike tilfeller i nye miljøer vil være sekundærtilfeller.  
• Kjemoprofylakse: behandling med antibakterielle midler (rifampicin eller 
ciprofloksasin) som dreper meningokokker på halsslimhinnen og dermed sanerer 
smittestoffet fra miljøet. 
• Antibiotikabehandling: behandling med antibiotika (penicillin) som dreper 
meningokokker som har invadert til blod og spinalvæske, men som ikke nødvendigvis 
vil drepe  meningokokker som befinner seg  på halsslimhinnen. 
Antibiotikabehandling med penicillin vil ikke utrydde meningokokkbakterien fra 
halsslimhinnen og smitteveiene vil derfor ikke brytes.    
 
C. REGELVERK OG NASJONALE RETNINGSLINJER 
• Lov om vern mot smittsomme sykdommer (Smittevernloven) av 05.08.1994 nr. 55:  § 
2-3 Meldingsplikt for leger, § 3-1 Om legers plikt til å diagnostisere og behandle 
allmennfarlige sykdommer, § 3-5 Legens plikt til å foreta undersøkelse av smittede 
personer og §3-6 Legens plikt til å foreta smitteoppsporing.  
• Forskrift om leger og annet helsepersonells melding og varsling av smittsomme 
sykdommer av 30.12. 1994 nr. 1224 
• Forskrift om allmennfarlige og smittsomme sykdommer av 01.01.1995 nr 100 
• Forskrift om stønad til dekning av utgifter til viktige legemidler og spesielt medisinsk 
utstyr av 18.04.97 
• Retningslinjer for diagnose og behandling av systemisk meningokokksykdom, 
hoveddokument IK-2297 (og sammendrag beregnet på sykehusavdelinger som 
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behandler meningokokkpasienter – IK-2296), Helsedirektoratet, Statens institutt for  
folkehelse og Institutt for farmakoterapi, Oslo 1989 
• Smittevern 5 - Smittevernhåndbok for kommunehelsetjenesten 2002 – 2003, 
Folkehelsa 2001 
•  MSIS-rapport uke 18 2002, Nasjonalt folkehelseinstitutt, Oslo 
 
 





1. Ved mistanke om meningokokksykdom skal  pasienten innlegges i sykehus 
 
2. Dersom transporttiden er lengre enn 30 minutter og pasienten har hudblødninger eller 
er medtatt, skal behandling inngangsettes før transport. Penicillin gis iv. Etter flg 
skjema (IK-2297): 
i. Barn under 2 år: 0,3 g (500.000 IE) 
ii. Barn 2-7 år: 0,6 g 
iii. Barn over 7 år og voksne: 1,2 g 
 
3. Før antibiotika gis skal det tas en halsprøve til dyrkning. En bomullspinne strykes mot 
tonsillene og sendes med pasienten på transportmedium for videreforsendelse til 
Telelab. Det er også anbefalt at innleggende lege tar blodprøve på eget 
blodkulturmedium som lege på legevakt bør ha i legekofferten.  
 
4. Legen bør om mulig følge pasienten til nærmeste sykehus. 
 





1. Gi husstandsmedlemmer under 15 år behandling med penicillin etter nasjonale 
retningslinjer (Smittevern 5). Utgifter til antibiotika dekkes av Folketrygden.  
 
2. Gi nærkontakter over  2 år gruppe A/C vaksine dersom sykdommen er forårsaket av 
meningokokkgruppene  A eller C, eller gruppe A/C/Y/W135 vaksine dersom sykdom 
med gruppe Y eller W135 foreligger (Smittevern 5). Utgifter til vaksine dekkes av 
Folketrygden. 
 
3. Ved bekreftet tilfelle av meningokokksykdom vil Telelab varsle telefonisk. Sammen 
med mikrobiolog fra Telelab utarbeides en liste over de nærkontaktene som det bør tas 
halsprøve til dyrkning fra. Slike nærkontakter kan være husstandsmedlemmer og 
andre som pasienten har sovet sammen med eller oppholdt seg i samme rom som i 
flere timer de siste 14 dagene før sykdommen oppsto, kyssekontakter, klassekamerater 
(men ikke skolelever utenfor klassen), voksne ansatte og barn i samme barnehage osv. 
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4. Organisere prøvetaking og informasjonsmøte. Mikrobiolog fra Telelab kommer og tar 
halsprøvene og deltar gjerne på informasjonsmøtet for familie, andre pårørende, 
skolelever, evt også for foreldre som det er naturlig å gi informasjon.  
 
5. Dersom det påvises at en eller flere av nærkontaktene har den sykdomsfremkallende 
meningokokkbakterien i halsen, skal disse ha rifampicin. Rifampicin utleveres kun fra 
Sykehusapoteket i Skien. Telelab kan være behjelpelig med å skaffe dette til veie. 
Dosering:  
o < 1 år: 5mg/kg  x 2 i 2 dager 
o 1-12 år: 10mg/kg x 2 i 2 dager 
o > 12 år: 600mg x 2 i 2 dager 
 
Nærkontakter som påvises å være smittebærer må behandles anonymt for ikke å bli 
stigmatisert i nærmiljøet.! 
 
Hos personer over 16 år kan ciprofloxacin 500 mg eller ofloxacin 400 mg som 
engangsdose brukes dersom rifampicin er vanskelig tilgjengelig (helger, høytider). 
 
6. Dersom det påvises sykdomsfremkallende meningokokker hos en nærkontakt skal det 
tas halsprøve også av denne kontaktens husstandsmedlemmmer og kyssekontakt selv 
om disse ikke har hatt direkte kontakt med primærtilfellet. 
 
7. Halsprøve til bakteriologisk kontroll av smittebærere skal tas  7-10 dager etter 
seponering.  En bomullspinne strykes over begge tonsiller og bakre halsvegg og 
sendes Telelab på transportmedium.  
 
8. Kommunelegen er ansvarlig for informasjon til nærmiljøet gjennom møter, skriv og 
pressemeldinger. Forslag til pressemelding og publikumsbrosjyre finnes under E. 
Utfyllende kommentarer.  
 




2. TILTAK SOM SETTES IGANG VED SYKEHUS  
 
1. Ved innleggelse av pasient med mistenkt meningokokksykdom skal sykehuslegen ta 
spinalvæskeprøve, blodkultur og halsprøve til bakteriologisk dyrkning og mikroskopi. 
Prøvene sendes til Telelab som ø.hjelp. Spinalpunksjon utføres ikke ved septisk sjokk 
eller tegn på økt intrakranialt trykk. 
 
2. Adekvat behandling skal gis etter avdelingens retningslinjer. 
 
3. Sykehuset skal varsle kommunelegen på pasientens hjemsted muntlig og skriftlig.  
 
4. Der hvor det er mest hensiktsmessig kan sykehuslegen igangsette penicillinbehandling 
av pasientens husstandsmedlemmer under 15 år i henhold til nasjonale retningslinjer 
(Smittevern 5). ). Kommunelegen skal varsles om dette.  
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5. Dersom husstandsmedlemmer av pasienten (mor, far, søsken ol) følger med pasienten 




6. Varsling til MSIS i hht nominativ meldeplikt, gruppe B sykdom. 
 
 
3. TILTAK SOM SETTES IGANG VED AS TELELAB. 
 
1. Prøver fra pasienten (fra innleggende lege og fra sykehuset) skal analyseres som ø.hj., 
også om natten og i helger. Prøvene sås ut og spinalvæske mikroskoperes. 
 
2. Oppstart  av Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark skjer ved mikrobiologiske påvisning av 
meningokokker i pasientprøve. Påvisning av meningokokker skjer ved: 
 
o Påvisning av gram negative diplokokker i spinalvæskeprøve ved mikroskopi 
o Påvisning av meningokokk DNA i spinalvæske ved PCR 
o Vekst av meningokokker fra blod og/eller spinalvæske 
o Vekst av meningokokker fra hals (NB. Kun dersom pasienten har kliniske 
symptomer på meningokokkinfeksjon)  
 
3. Dersom meningokokker påvises varsler Telelab vakthavende lege ved 
sykehusavdelingen. Dersom pasientens familie er tilstede hos pasienten anbefaler 
Telelab at vakthavende sykehuslege tar halsprøve av disse og sende prøvene til 
Telelab.  
 
4. Telelab varsler snarest kommunelegen for planlegging av miljøundersøkelse.  
 
5. Sammen med kommunelegen i pasientens hjemkommune er lege ved Telelab med på 
å definere hvem som er pasientens nærkontakter og som det skal samles inn halsprøve 
fra. 
 
6.  Telelab bistår i innsamling av halsprøver og står til rådighet for kommunelegen ved 
informasjonsmøter i samband med miljøundersøkelse.  
 
7. Sykdomsfremkallende meningokokker påvises ved: 
a. Halsprøvene fra nærkontaktene sås ut på CV skåler og inkuberes over natten 
ved 370 C i 10% CO2. 
b. Skålene avleses. Ved vekst av oxydase positive kolonier med utseende og 
egenskaper som meningokokker, spres bakteriene på blod- og brunskål og den 
resterende vekst på CV skålen benyttes til å ekstrahere DNA for PCR AREA 
etter nærmere metode på laboratoriet. 
c. Spredningsskålene inkuberes til neste dag og det settes opp forgjæring, 
sulfaresistens og grupping etter nærmere metode. Dersom meningokokker 
påvises fryses de.  
d. DNA fra nærkontaktisolatene analyseres vha PCR AREA sammen med isolatet 
fra pasienten. Dersom det båndmønsteret som fremkommer ved PCR AREA 
av bærerisolatet er identisk med isolatet fra pasienten antas de to isolatene å 
tilhøre samme stamme  
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e. I visse situasjoner kan ulikheter i sulfafølsomhet mellom pasientstammen og 
bærerstammen bli brukt til å utelukke identitet.  
 
8. Om det påvises sykdomsfremkallende meningokokker i halsen til en eller flere av 
nærkontaktene, skal mikrobiolog ved Telelab varsle kommunelegen umiddelbart slik 
at rifampicin profylakse (evt ciprofloxacin) kan startes opp.  
 
9. Dersom den sykdomsfremkallende meningokokkbakterien påvises hos en eller flere 
nærkontakter, skal husstandsmedlemmene til disse bærerene og evt kyssekontakter 
tilbys halsprøve.  
 
10. Telelab sender skriftlig rapport om resultatet av undersøkelsen til kommunelegen med 
kopi til sykehusavdeling.  
 
 
E. UTFYLLENDE KOMMENTARER  
 
1.  INFORMASJON TIL NÆRMILJØET 
 
A. BARNEHAGER – SKOLER 
I barnehagemiljø og skolemiljø kan det være greit å sende brev med hjem til 
foreldrene. Skolen/barnehagen ordner med dette, men teksten på informasjonen til 
foreldrene bør godkjennes av kommunelegen. Eks.: "Vi har hatt et tilfelle av 
meningokokksykdom/ smittsom hjernehinnebetennelse ved skolen i ........ 
Helsetjenesten har gitt råd til skolen og iverksatt de tiltak som er nødvendige i tråd 
med gjeldende faglige retningslinjer. Familiemedlemmer som bor og spiser under 
samme tak som pasienten og som er under 15 år, skal få penicillinbehandling. 
Medelever til den syke skal være fritatt for kroppsøving i 1 uke. Skolen går ellers som 





Det er ingen grunn til å kontakte presse/radio i forbindelse med utbrudd av 
meningokokksykdom. På grunn av den store oppmerksomhet som utbrudd av denne 
sykdommen har fått i våre media synes det rett å være forberedt på at en kan bli 
kontaktet. Det er vanskelig å avvise journalister med bakgrunn i dårlig tid etc. (dårlig 
tid blir det alltid i forbindelse med utbrudd av meningokokksykdom). Vær derfor 
forberedt. Ha klart for deg at en nøktern pressemelding er mye bedre enn at 
journalisten "komponerer" noe ut fra spinkle opplysninger (rykter). Bruk 
pressemeldingen til å gi saklig informasjon. 
Eks. på pressemelding: 
"Vi har hatt et tilfelle av meningokokksykdom (hjernehinnebetennelse) i .... Pasienten 
er innlagt på sykehus. Gjeldende faglige retningslinjer i forbindelse med tilfeller av 
meningokokksykdom er satt i verk av helsetjenesten. Helsetjenesten i kommunen ber 
publikum kontakte legekontoret/legevakta dersom en har spørsmål i forbindelse med 







I hver kommune bør det (på forhånd!) lages ei lita brosjyre som legges ut på 
legekontorenes venteværelser, helsestasjonene etc. når et tilfelle av 
meningokokksykdom har opptrådt. 
Forslag til tekst i en brosjyre: 
”Hver vinter/vår opplever vi tilfeller av meningokokksykdom (ofte kalt smittsom 
hjernehinnebetennelse). Folk er naturlig nok redde for å bli smitta av denne 
sykdommen. Sykdommen er dramatisk og skremmende, men angsten for 
sykdom/smitte blant folk blir lett et stort tilleggsproblem. Kunnskap om sykdommen 
og informasjon om forebyggende tiltak er viktige å kjenne til. 
 
HVA ER MENIGOKOKKSYKDOM? 
Sykdommen skyldes ofte en bakterie - meningokokk - som lager betennelse i 
hjernehinnene og/eller blodet. Pasienten får som regel høy feber, hodepine og kvalme. 
Stivhet i rygg og nakke kan også være vanlige symptomer. Pasienten blir også ofte 
uklar og virker mer syk enn det en vanligvis opplever ved influensalignende sykdom. 
Et rødt småprikkete utslett (små hudblødninger) er en svært viktig observasjon! De 
som er mest utsatt for denne type for meningokokksykdom er barn og ungdom. 
 
HVORDAN SMITTER SYKDOMMEN? 
Meningokokker (smittestoffet) finner en i halsen hos ca. 25 % av alle i en 
normalbefolkning. En regner med at barn i regelen blir smittet av en frisk voksen 
bærer. Hvorfor noen av disse bakteriene plutselig blir "sinte" og går til angrep, og 
hvem de går til angrep på, vet vi ikke nok om til å kunne sette inn mottiltak. 
Smittemåten er dråper fra nese og munn fra en bærer til nese og munn til den som blir 
syk. Meningokokkene kan ikke overleve særlig lenge utenfor kroppen. 
Meningokokksykdom er altså en etter måten lite smittsom sykdom. Langt mindre 
smittsom enn f.eks. de vanlige barnesykdommene. 
 
TILTAK FOR Å HINDRE NYE TILFELLER: 
Helsemyndighetene har kommet med nasjonale retningslinjer når det gjelder generelle 
forebyggende tiltak. Søsken, familie eller andre som bor sammen med pasienten og 
som er under 15 år, får penicillin og skal holde seg borte fra skole/barnehage i en uke. 
"Sosialkontakter", klassekamerater og barn i samme barnehagegruppe som den syke, 
blir tilrådd å unngå fysisk aktivitet i en uke. Dette er et tiltak for å hindre utbrudd av 
sykdommen hos eventuelt andre som kan være smitta i denne gruppa. Foreldrene bør 
være raske til å ta kontakt med lege/legevakt dersom en får mistanke om 
meningokokksykdom. Sykdommen kan utvikle seg raskt, og tidlig behandling er ofte 
avgjørende for hvorledes det går med pasienten. 
Hvis du har spørsmål - ta gjerne kontakt med helsesøster/legekontoret, eventuelt 
legevakta utenom den vanlige kontortida. 
Et lite råd til slutt: 
Pass alltid på å ha et termometer som er i orden i huset. Febermåling bør gjøres før en 
kontakter lege dersom det er mulig. Kontakte helsetjenesten dersom du har spørsmål.” 
 
2. FORHOLDET TIL NASJONALE RETNINGSLINJER 
 
Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark er et tillegg til de nasjonale retningslinjer. Nasjonale 
anbefalinger slik de fremkommer i Smittevern 5 og IK-2297 skal derfor følges. 
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Hovedskillet mellom de nasjonale tiltak og Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark er at vi i 
Telemark i tillegg forsøker å fjerne den sykdomsfremkallende meningokokken fra 
miljøet. Dette kan ikke oppnås ved penicillinbehandling, for penicillin dreper ikke 
meningokokker som befinner seg på halsslimhinnen. Slik sanering kan bare skje 
gjennom kjemoprofylakse. I neste alle andre land enn Norge benyttes 
kjemoprofylakse, men da til alle nærkontakter. Vi i Telemark ønsker å begrense 
bruken av kjemoprofylakse bare til de få som virkelig har den sykdomsfremkallende 
meningokokken i halsen.  
 
3. VITENSKAPELIGE PUBLIKASJONER OM MENINGOKOKKPROSJEKT 
TELEMARK. 
 
Det er publisert en rekke artikler om Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark og det er per 
februar 2003 i gang et arbeide med å bearbeide alle resultatene fra de første 15 årene.  
Opplegget har ført til diskusjoner men har også gitt som resultat at de nyere norske 
retningslinjene (Smittevern 5) har blitt endret siden de opprinnelige retningslinjene fra 
1977, slik at de nå er nærmere opplegget for Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark. Det 







1. Kristiansen BE, Ask E, Jenkins A, Fermer C, Rådstrøm P, Skøld O. Rapid 
diagnosis of meningococcal meningitis by polymerase chain reaction. The 
Lancet 1991; June 29:1568-9 
2. Kristiansen BE, Tveten Y, Jenkins A. Which contacts of patients with 
meningococcal disease carry the pathogenic strain of Neisseria meningitides? 
A population based study. BMJ 1998; 317:621-5 
3. Kristiansen BE, Tveten Y, Ask E, Knapskog AB, Reiten T, Steen-Johnsen J, 
Hopen G.  Meningokokkprosjekt Telemark. Tidsskrift Nor Legeforen 
1993;113:2933-7 
4. Kristiansen BE, Tveten Y, Ask E, Reiten T, Knapskog AB, Steen-Johnsen J, 
Hopen G.  Preventing secondary cases of meningococcal disease by 
identifying and eradicating disease-causing strains in close contacts of patients. 
Scand J Infect Dis 1992;24:165-73 
5. Kristiansen BE and Tveten Y. Smitteoppsporing og smittesanering ved 
meningokokksykdom. Norsk Epidemiologi. 1995;5:7983 
6. Kristiansen BE, Fermer C, Jenkins A, Ask E, Swedberg G, Skøld O. PCR 
amplicon restriction endonuclease analysis of the chromosomal dhps gene of 
Neisseria meningitidis: a method for studying the spread of the disease-causing 
strain in contacts of patients with meningococcal disease. J Clin Microbiol 
1995;33:1174-9 
7. Kristiansen BE, Knapskog AB. Secondary prevention of meningococcal 
disease. British Medical Journal (editorial). 1996; 3 February :621  
8. Aakre R, Jenkins A, Kristiansen BE, Frøholm LO. Clonal distribution of 
invasive Neisseria meningitides isolates from the Norwegian County of 
Telemark; 1987-1995. J Clin Microbiol. 1998; 36:2623-8. 
 
